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CREDITORS RIGHTS UNDER THE REcoRDiNG STATUTES

CREDITORS RIGHTS UNDER THE RECORDING
STATUTES
E. GEORGE RUDOLPH*
The Wyoming Statute on chattel mortgages provides in part that
such a mortgage "shall be absolutely void as against the creditors
of the mortgagor-unless said mortgage-shall be filed or recorded
as hereinafter provided."1 This language inevitably raises two questions. First, what is meant by the term "creditors"? And second, how
does such a creditor proceed in asserting the invalidity of the mortgage?
No lawyer will have difficulty with the second question. The
creditor must first reduce his claim to judgment. Then he may levy
execution on the property and the issue can be tried with the mortgagee in a possessory action,2 or perhaps by intervention in a foreclosure suit. s Or the creditor could, after he obtained his judgment,
bring a creditors bill to establish the invalidity of the mortgage.4
But the important thing is that the creditor must first reduce his
claim to judgment because, until he does, he is in no position to assert
any rights in his debtor's property.5
However, the answer to the first question is not so simple and it
is with this that the discussion which follows will be concerned. The
basic difficulty may be illustrated by a simple hypothetical situation.
Suppose that D gives a mortgage on a certain chattel to M which is
not immediately recorded, and that, while it is unrecorded, C extends
credit to D. Thereafter, in chronological order, M records and C obtains judgment and has execution levied on the chattel. Under these
facts some courts will allow C to prevail over M's mortgage, but
others will not because he did not obtain a lien on the property before
the mortgage was recorded. We will examine this difference of
opinion in some detail later, but now it seems well to disgress for a
moment to note that problems concerning creditors are not confined
to the chattel mortgage statutes.
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. Admitted
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to practice in Illinois, Michigan, and South Dakota.
1. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 145, sec. 59-105.
2. Carroll v. Anderson, 128 Ia. 124, 103 N. W. 104 (1905); Ward v. Parker,
128 Ia, 124, 103 N. W. 104 (1905).

3. American Loan and Trust Co. v. Olympia Light and Power Co., 72 Fed. 620
4.
5.

(C. C. Wash. 1896).
Forrester v. Kearney Nat'l. Bank, 49 Neb. 655, 68 N. W. 1059 (1896).
First National Bank of Sheridan v. Woodworth, 7 Wyo. 11, 49 Pac. 406,
(1897) ; First National Bank v. Ludvigsen, 8 Wyo. 230, 57 Pac. 934 (1898) ;
Union Bank of Oshkosh v. Oium, 3 N. D. 193, 54 N. W. 1034 (1892) ; Ransom
and Randolph Co. v. Moore, 272 Mich. 31, 261 N. W. 128 (1935).
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The Wyoming statute on recording conveyances of realty affords
creditors of the grantor no protection against an unrecorded conveyance. It provides only that an unrecorded conveyance of realty is void
as against subsequent purchasers for value in good faith,6 and a
creditor can't qualify as such, even after he has obtained a lien on the
property by reducing his claim to judgment, because he gives no new
value at the time he obtains this interest.7 Two words of caution are
necessary with respect to this, however. First, even though the judgment, creditor, as such, is not a purchaser for value, the buyer at the
execution sale probably will be, and this may be so even though the
judgment creditor himself buys in the property. in complete or partial
satisfaction of his judgment.8 Second, under some circumstances the
failure to record may be evidence of a fraudulent conveyance and
then a creditor of the grantor may pursue the property in the hands
of the grantee, but he does so on the basis of the law of fraudulent
conveyances and not on the recording statutes.9 More will be said of
this last idea in connection with chattel mortgages.
Before leaving the real estate recording statutes it should be
noted that, while statutes similar to Wyoming's in this respect are
fairly common, they are by no means universal. A considerable
number of real estate recording statutes extend their protection to
creditors of the grantor in one form or another. We will pause with
these only long enough to observe what seems to be a decided reluctance to give such provisions their full effect. A probable reason for
this reluctance was expressed by a New Jersey court in considering
the provision of their statute making an unrecorded conveyance of
realty void as to judgment creditors of the grantor. After noting that
the judgment creditor gave no new value, as a purchaser must to be
within the protection of the recording statute, the court commented,
"This partiality to a judgment creditor does not commend itself to a
court of equity."o An interesting illustration of this tendency is found
in a line of Nebraska decisions construing the statute of that state
which provides that an unrecorded conveyance of realty is void as to
creditors of the grantor.11 This statute, like many of its kind, goes on
6.
7.
8.

9.
10.
11.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, sec. 66-119.
Frank v. Hicks, 4 Wyo. 502, 35 Pac. 475 (1893), 3 Glenn on Mortgages 1943
sec. 368.1.
3 Glenn on Mortgages, 1943, sec. 368.1. This was apparently recognized by
the court in Frank v. Hicks, supra, note 7. The mortgage not being entitled
to record and thus the mortgagee having no chance of protecting himself in
that manner, the court enjoined the judgment creditor and the sheriff from
proceeding with the execution sale.
Farmers Say. Bank of Williamsburg v. Pugh, 204 Iowa 580, 215 N. W. 652
(1927). Compare Talcott v. Levy, 20 N. Y. S. 440 (1892), aff'd, 143 N. Y.
636, 37 N. E. 826.
Martin v. Bowen, 51 N. J. Eq. 452 26 Atl. 823 (1893).
Rev. Stat. of Neb. 1943 sec. 76-238.
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to say that the unrecorded conveyance is void only as to those subsequent purchasers and creditors who shall first record their "deeds,
mortgages, or other instruments." Therefore, the Nebraska court reasons, the prior deed will be invalid as against the interest of the "creditor" only if the sheriff's deed issued on the execution sale is first recorded.12 Thus in Nebraska, where creditors are expressly included
in the statute, the creditor actually gets neither more nor less protection than he does in Wyoming where he is not mentioned at all.
It is hoped that the foregoing discussion of the real estate recording acts will be of value for purposes of comparison as we now return
to the chattel mortgage statutes and the difference of opinion previously mentioned. Re-phrased, this split of authority may be stated
as follows: some courts will hold a chattel mortgage void as to any
person who occupies the position of a creditor, in the usual meaning
of the term, at any time while the mortgage is unrecorded, even
though it may be later recorded before the creditor has obtained a
lien on the property through judicial proceedings while courts of the
other persuasion hold for the creditor only if he obtains such a lien
before the mortgage is finally recorded. Since the Wyoming court has
never had occasion to pass on this question the writer feels justified
in reviewing the merits of the two positions at length.
At the outset it must be admitted that the chief purpose of the
recording acts is to supply a source of information for the protection
of those persons who give value in reliance upon another's ownership
of particular property. The most obvious illustrations of such persons
are, of course, purchasers, mortgagees, and the like, because the form
of the transaction leaves no doubt that they acted in reliance on the
other parties ownership of the property in question. Since practically
all chattel mortgage statutes provide for creditors as well as bona
fide purchasers, the legislators have apparently decided that creditors
likewise act in reliance upon the property which their debtors apparently own.18 While one may have considerable doubts as to this, the
proposition will be accepted here for the time being. But once this is
conceded a further propositions seems self-evident. If the creditor
relies upon his debtor's apparent ownership of the chattels at all,
he does so at the time he extends credit. If the mortgage is unrecorded
at this time the harm has been done and a later recording will do
12.

Harrall and Uhl v. Gray, 10 Neb. 186, 4 N. W. 1040 (1880); Mansfield v.
Gregory, 11 Neb. 297, 9 N. W. 87 (1881) ; Omaha Loan & Building Ass'n. v.
Turk, 146 Neb. 859, 21 N. W. (2d) 865 (1946).

13.

Jones, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales, Bowers Edition, see. 247.
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nothing to cure it. This idea is the basis for the view of New York14
and Michigan,15 among others,16 giving the creditor priority if the
mortgage is originally unrecorded, even though it may later be recorded before the creditor gets a lien.
But from another point of view, and ignoring for the moment
the idea of fraudulent conveyance, it seems logically indefensible to
give the creditor a position of priority dating from a time at which
he had no interest in the property at all. Suppose that the mortgagee,
instead of recording his old mortgage after the creditor has appeared
on the scene, rather tears it up and then prevails on the mortgagor
to give him a new one which he promptly records. In these circumstances it is difficult to see how the creditor could attack the mortgage with any more success than he can attack any other transfer
that the debtor may make of particular property before the creditor
has improved his position by acquiring a lien on that property.17
The preceding paragraph began by mentioning the idea of
fraudulent conveyance and it is to this we must look for an explanation of the seemingly illogical situation described above. As a general
proposition the right of a creditor to realize out of property which
his debtor has fraudulenlty conveyed does not depend on his having
14.
15.

Karst v. Gane, 136 N. Y. 316, 32 N. E. 1073 (1893).
Anch v. Andres, 289 Mich. 206, 286 N. W. 214 (1939) ; Ransom and Randolph
Co. v. Moore, 272 Mich. 31, 261 N. W. 128 (1935) ; Feary v. Cummings, 41
Mich. 376, 1 N. W. 946 (1879).
16. Union Bank of Oshkosh v. Oium, 3 N. D. 193, 64 N. W. 1034 (1892). Hollenbeck v. Louden, 35 S. D. 320, 152 N. W. 116 (1915). The statutes under which
these cases were decided ahd those of Michigan and New York are substantially the same as that of Wyoming in this respect. But it should be
noted that different types of statutes in other states make this result more
or less mandatory. See Collateral Finance Co. v. Braud, 298 Ill. App. 130,
18 N. E. (2.d) 392 (1938) in which the court construed an amendment to
the Illinois statute requiring that the mortgage be filed within ten days as
having this effect and so changing the previous rule of Springer v. Lipsis,
209 111. 261, 70 N. E. 641 (1904) requiring the creditor to obtain a lien before
recording if he was to prevail over the mortgage. To same effect see Roe
v. Meding, 53 N. J. Eq. 350, 33 Atl. 394 (1895). But see Wilson v. Leslie,
20 Ohio 161 (1851) and, Moore v. Chilson, 26 Ariz. 244, 224 Pac. 818. (1924)
both holding that the creditor must obtain a lien before filing to prevail
even though the statute involved expressly required prompt recording and
the mortgagee had not complied with this.
See also Ruggles v. Cannedy, 127 Ca. 290, 53 Pac. 911 (1898) and Volker
Lumber Co. v. Utah and Oregon Lumber Co., 45 Utah 603, 148 Pac. 365
(1915) discussed in note 19.
Probably the most serious legislative effort along these lines is the
statute of the state of Washington which provides that an unrecorded chattel
mortgage is void as to creditors of the mortgagor, "whether or not they have
or claim a lien on the property." Rem. Rev. Stat., 1932, sec. 3780.
17. This argument is well stated in American Loan and Trust Co. v. Olympia
Light and Power Co., 72 Fed. 602 (C. C. Wash., 1896). See also Cameron,
Hull and Co. v. Marvin, 26 Kans. 612 (1881), In Re Shirley, 112 Fed. 301
(C. C. A, 6, 1901) and Wilson v. Leslie, 20 Ohio 161 (1851).
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any lien on the property prior to the transfer.18 Indeed if he had such
a lien he would not have to bother proving his case of fraud. But
this again brings us back to the idea of reliance, because if failure
to record is going to serve as a workable device for defrauding creditors it must be because the creditor relies on his debtor's apparent
ownership of the mortgaged property which he has in his possession
as mortgagor. 19
This idea of reliance has been pretty generally accepted ever since
Twynes case,20 but there have been a few cases which dissent and
these seem to have the better of the argument. Thus in Ward v.
Parker2l the levying creditor of the mortgagor urged that the mortgagee, who had neglected to file his mortgage for a considerable time,
should be stopped from asserting the mortgage even though it was
ultimately filed before the levy of execution. But the Iowa court
refused to apply such an estoppel because there was no evidence that
the creditor had relied on the particular mortgaged property in extending credit. On this issue it would seem the presumption should be
against the creditor because, once he has decided to rely on particular
property of his debtor, he will ordinarily take the next obvious step
and demand a security interest of some type in that property. The
creditor's later protestations of reliance should be discounted greatly.
As illustrative consider the situation in First Nat. Bank of Albuquerque v. Haverkamp,22 a New Mexico case. Again the creditors, this
time represented by the mortgagor's trustee in bankruptcy, were
urging that the mortgagee should be estopped under facts almost the
same as in Ward v. Parker. However, in this case the creditors testified that they would not have extended credit had they known of the
mortgage. In spite of this, the court found against them on the issue
of reliance because these same creditors also extended credit after the
18.

19.
20.
21.
22.

Some question may be raised as to the validity of this premise in our situation. It has been suggested that the chattel mortgage statutes are an outgrowth of the doctrine of Twynes case 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601), holding that
it may be fraudulent as to the creditors of a transferor of chattels for him
to remain in possession after the transfer. See I Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences, 1940, see. 350. But for the creditor to successfully
assert this fraud he must act before the transferee eventually takes possession. See Glenn, op. cit. sec. 501. It can be argued that, since the statute
simply provides recording as a substitute for delivery of possession, the
creditor could be required to obtain a lien before recording consistently with
the idea of fraudulent conveyance. See Moore v. Ohilson, 26 Ariz. 244, 224
Pac. 818 (1924).
But in California and Utah the chattel mortgage statutes are included
as a part of the law of fraudulent conveyances and the courts have held
that the creditor will prevail if the mortgage is unfiled when he extends
credit even though it may later be filed before he gets a lien. Ruggles v.
Cannedy, 127 Cal. 290, 53 Pac. 911 (1898) ; Volker Lumber Co. v. Utah, and
Oregon Lumber Co., 45 Utah 603, 148 Pac. 365 (1915).
Palo Savings Bank v. Cameron, 184 Ia. 193, 168 N. W. 769 (1918).
76 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601).
128 Ia. 124, 103 N. W. 104 (1905).
16 N. M. 497, 121 Pac. 31 (1911).
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mortgage was recorded. This suggests a distinction between reliance
merely on the mortgagor's possession and reliance on that possession
with the failure to record. It is obvious that reliance upon possession
will avail the creditor nothing if the mortgage is recorded at the
time. For purposes of estoppel at least the reliance required should
be on the failure to record and to establish this it is submitted that
the creditor must at least prove that he examined the records before
extending credit.23 However, even though the creditor is able to prove
this, the case of In re Shirley24 suggests a further difficulty in permitting him to assert an estoppel. In that case, again with a fact
situation substantially like that in Ward v. Parker, the court refused
to find the estoppel because, even though the creditor may in fact
have relied on the mortgaged property, he was not justified in doing
so, or for that matter in relying on any particular property of the
debtor, since, as we have previously observed, a debtor may effectively
dispose of any of his property, as against a general creditor, until
such creditor changes his status by acquiring a lien through judicial
proceedings. This suggests a further thought. The chattels which a
debtor possesses, may indicate something as to his gross wealth
although the picture is apt to be pretty inadequate if the particular
debtor happens to have considerable intangible assets. But the general
creditors legitimate concern would seem to be more with the debtor's
net position than his total assets since he is neither entitled to, nor
restricted to, a particular asset out of which to realize his claim. From
this point of view a chattel mortgage is of no more significance than
an unsecured debt.25
One further point must be considered with respect to the idea
of fraudulent conveyance. In each of the cases discussed in the preceding paragraph the court actually decided three things. First, the
creditor, not having obtained a lien before the mortgage was recorded,
was not entitled to priority over the mortgage merely through an
23.

24.

This suggestion, of course, runs counter to the general interpretations of
the recording statutes with respect to later bona fide purchasers, but such
purchasers prevail over the unrecorded mortgage simply by the terms of
the statute and not by any doctrine of estoppel such as the creditors were
urging in these cases.
112 Fed. 301 (C. C. A. 6, 1901) (Involving the Ohio chattel mortgage

statute).
25.

Any evidence concerning the extent to which creditors actually rely on
particular property must of necessity be rather inconclusive. But some
interesting information along these lines is contained in Professor Hanna's
article, "Extension of Public Recordation" 31 Columbia L. R. 615. The following is particularly pertinent to the idea expressed above. " . . . in a
questionnaire answered by 44 large banks, less than one third indicated that
in extending financial credit they regarded either visible merchandise or
other assets. The replies were practically unanimous that credit was extended
on the basis of financial statements, supplemented by business references
or personal acquaintance. In response to the specific question, approximately
three-forths stated that the major basis of credit was the financial statement." (p. 636)

CREDITORS

RIGHTS UNDER THE RECORDING

STATUTES

application of the recording statute. On this the decisions are in direct
conflict with those of New York, Michigan, and jurisdictions of like
persuasion. Second, the failure of the mortgagee to record promptly
does not furnish a ground for estoppel for the reason considered
above. And third, the failure to record did not, under the particular
circumstances, make the mortgage a fraudulent conveyance. It seems
significant that the courts considered estoppel and fraudulent conveyance as two separate issues, and further that reliance by the
creditor was apparently not considered necessary to invalidate the
mortgage on the ground of fraudulent conveyance. This does not
square with the statement previously made that the effectiveness of
the unrecorded mortgage as an instrument of fraud depends on such
reliance. And reliance has always been an important element of the
doctrine of apparent ownership as a part of the law of fraudulent
conveyances.26 The explanation lies in the rule that when the failure
to record is part of a fraudulent design the issue of reliance will be
presumed in favor of the creditor, and probably the only evidence
that will be competent to rebut this presumption is that which shows
knowledge of the mortgage on the part of the creditor at the time he
extends credit.27 This presumption seems fair enough in view of the
relative moral positions of the parties, if the mortgagee is in fact
guilty of participation in a fraudulent scheme. But certainly the mere
failure to record should not be even rebuttable evidence of such fraud.
The three cases discussed previously on the estoppel question agree
with this. Both Ward v. Parker and In re Shirley, in refusing to find
fraud, emphasized the absence of any agreement between the mortgagor and mortgagee to withhold the mortgage from record. Some
such agreement seems almost indespensable to the charge of fraud
inasmuch as the election to record or not is ordinarily in the mortgagee
whereas the mortgagor will be the only beneficiary if the fraud is
successful.28 Of course such an agreement may be implied from the
facts, and this seems to be the proper basis for those cases holding
unrecorded conveyances of real estate to be fraudulent when the
grantor and grantee are husband and wife and the conveyance is
voluntary in the sense of not being made for a full consideration.29
The preceding discussion is intended to demonstrate the unsoundness of an interpretation of the chattel mortgage recording statute
which will make a mortgage originally unfiled invalid as against a
creditor of the mortgagor even though the mortgage is eventually
filed before the creditor gains a specific interest in the property by
execution. Such a rule cannot be justified on the principal of estoppel
since a necessary element to estoppel, reliance, is absent in at least
26.
27.
28.
29.

1 Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences, 1940, sec. 348.
1 Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences, 1940, sec. 343.
See also Palo Savings Bank v. Cameron, 184 la. 183. 168 N. W. 769 (1918).
See cases cited in note 9 supra.
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a large percentage of cases. Nor can this rule be supported by considering the recording statute as a sort of addition to the law of fraudulent conveyances since the unrecorded mortgage is not particularly
useful as a tool for fraud-at least for defrauding creditors-and
furthermore the mere failure to record is susceptible of many other
explanations besides a fraudulent intent. It must be admitted that
the foregoing arguments apply with almost equal force against including any creditors, even those who obtain a lien before recording,
within the protection of the recording statute. However, the legislative policy on this is too well established to permit serious argument.
But the interpretation requiring a lien before recording at least has
the advantage of being restrictive. And more important, it is much
easier of application, not being subject to the difficulties that the
courts have experienced in trying to give a logical and consistent
application to the interpretation in favor of general creditors.
In the first place there is the problem of the prior creditor, that
is, a creditor who became such before the execution of the mortgage.
Now it may be true that the hopes and expectations of such a creditor
are frustrated by the mortgaged property being removed from his
reach, but it cannot be said that he was misled since at the time he
extended credit the apparent situation was the true one, his debtor
in fact owned the property.o New York holds in favor of the prior
creditor on the ground that he may forego pressing his claim in
reliance on his debtors apparent continued ownership of the mortgaged property.S1 This seems to be an unjustified extension of the
original error on the question of reliance. Michigan gives the prior
creditor no protection at all and, while this is logical enough,
there is nothing in the statute to indicate the legislature's intent to
confine its operation to subsequent creditors.82 The South Dakota
court has done an interesting piece of fence straddling on this problem. While it will follow the New York and Michigan rule with respect
to subsequent creditors, it will hold for the prior creditor only if he
obtains a lien before the mortgage is recorded.88 These three states
are enough to illustrate that courts which are of the same persuasion
on our fundamental difference of opinion have literally taken every
possible position with respect to the prior creditor.
A further logical difficulty arises from the New York rule giving
a prior creditor the same protection against an unrecorded chattel
mortgage that it accords a subsequent creditor. Obviously the execu30.
31.
32.
33.

Palo Savings Bank v. Cameron, 184 Ia. 183, 168 N. W. 709 (1918).
Kart v. Gane, 136 N. Y. 316, 32 N. E. 1073 (1893). See also Noyes v. Bank
of Italy, 206 Cal. 266, 274 Pac. 68 (1929).
Ransom and Randolph Co. v. Moore, 272 Mich. 31, 261 N. W. 128 (1935).
See also Union Bank of Oshkosh v. Oium, 3 N. D. 193, 54 N. W. 1034 (1892).
Hollenbeck v. Louden, 35 S. D. 320, 152 N. W. 116 (1915). To same effect
though under a different type of statute, see Volker Lumber Co. v. Utah
& Oregon Lumber Co., 45 Utah 603, 148 Pac. 365 (1915).
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tion and recording of a mortgage cannot be simultaneous, and therefore, with reference to the prior creditor, the mortgage must always
be unrecorded for some period of time. This difficulty is met in New
York by the proposition that the mortgage is made void only by an
unreasonable delay in recording.84 No doubt this can be applied to
sustain a mortgage as against one who extends credit after its execution and before recording in a case where the recording is reasonably
prompt. But consistency in this idea breaks down at a further point,
for the New York court has conceded that if a creditor actually acquires a lien during the interm between execution and recording he
will prevail over the mortgage regardless of the mortgagees promptness in recording.35 And a further inconsistency may be observed. The
statutes of some states contain express requirements for recording
within a certain period after execution, and in Illinois at least such a
provision has been applied to make a mortgage not seasonably recorded void even as to creditors becoming such after a late recording.86
The same result would seem to follow logically from the judge-made
requirement of prompt recording in New York, but a federal court
sitting in New York has refused to go this far, escaping the logical
difficulty by saying that a person who extends credit after filing is
not a "creditor" within the meaning of the statute.87
Another difference of opinion arise among these jurisdictions
when the mortgage later takes possession instead of recording. New
York apparently will hold for the mortgagee if he takes possession
before the creditor obtains a lien, even though recording at the same
time might be too late to perfect the mortgagee's interest. 8s Michigan
on the other hand, holds that a late taking of possession is just as
ineffective as a late recording in perfecting the mortgage against
34. It cannot be demonstrated, of course, that this requirement of prompt recording was formulated solely because of the problem of the existing creditor.
But it was first clearly stated in Karst v. Gane, 136 N. Y. 316, 32 N. E.
1073, the leading case on the rights of existing creditors, and it apparently

35.
36.

37.
38.

does not prevail under the Michigan statute which protects only subsequent
creditors. See General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Coller, 106 F.
(2d) 584 (C. C. A. 6, 1939).
Karst v. Gane, 136 N. Y. 316, 32 N. E. 1073 (1893).
Collateral Finance Co. v. Braud, 298 Ill. App. 130, 18 N. E. (2d) 392 (1938).

See also Roe v. Meding, 53
court said the New Jersey
have this effect except for
"valid as against creditors

N. J. Eq. 350, 33 Atl. 394 (1895), in which the
statute requiring "immediate" recording would

a further provision that the mortgage shall be
from the time of recording."
In this situation it seems clear that Wyoming will hold for the mortgagee. See Carroll v. Anderson, 30 Wyo. 217, 218 Pac. 1038 (1923), which
however, involves a late taking of possession rather than recording.
In re Meyers, 19 F. (2d) 600 (D. C. N. D. N. Y. 1927), aff'd, 24 E (2d)
349 (C. C. A. 2, 1928).
Bowdish v. Page, 153 N. Y. 104, 47 N. E. 44 (1897). See Glenn, Fraudulent
Conveyances and Preferences, 1940, sec. 502.
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intervening creditors.39 Logic again seems to favor the Michigan view
unless some distinction can be made in this respect between taking
possessio nand recording. It has been suggested that the two'are not
equivalents because the taking of possession requires a fresh consent
of the mortgagor, and so in effect constitutes a new transaction which
should be judged without reference to the original mortgage, whereas
the late recording is simply the unilateral act of the mortgagee and
the old transaction continues tainted with the original fraud.40 This
does not seem very persuasive, and indeed it might be argued that
the later cooperation of the mortgagor is itself some evidence of a
fraudulent design at the outset. At best this appears to be another
purposeless distinction in a field that already abounds with them.
These diverse holdings among jurisdictions seeking to protect
general creditors against unrecorded chattel mortgages seem to be
the result of attempting to build logically on an illogical premise. The
writer submits that the only satisfactory method of handling the
recording statutes is simply to treat them as establishing an order
of priority among conflicting claimants of the same property, and for
this purpose it is of course necessary that the creditor have an interest
in the particular property by execution or attachment. Even giving
the word creditor this restricted meaning its inclusion in the statute
has considerable significance. A reference back to the discussion
of the Wyoming statute on recording conveyances of realty will recall
to mind that in the absence of an express provision for creditors,
even a creditor who has reduced his claim to a lien by judicial proceedings will take subject to any unrecorded conveyances or mortgages
that his debtor may have previously executed.
It would seem that the above discussion should be equally applicable to other forms of chattel security, such as conditional sales,
and with respect to policy the writer believes that it is. But unfortunately the statutes of a given state on chattel mortgages and
conditional sales may vary considerably in this respect. Furthermore,
the conditional sales statutes vary so greatly from state to state that
there is little possibility of generalizing on them, although it can
probably be said with some safety that there is much less tendency
to hold conditional sales void if they are originally unrecorded but
39.

40.

Ransom and Randolph Co. v. Moore, 272 Mich. 31, 261 N. W. 128 (1935).
See also Rolando v. Everett, 165 P. (2d) 33 (3rd Dist. Ct. of App. of Calif.,
1946) and Collateral Finance Co. v. Braud, 298 Ill. App. 130, 18 N. E. (2d)
392 (1938).
Cameron, Hull and Co. v. Marvin, 26 Kans. 612 (1881); Bowdish v. Page,
153 N. Y. 104, 47 N. E. 44 (1897). See also American Loan and Trust Co.
v. Olympia Light and Power Co., 72 Fed. 620 (C. C. Wash. 1896), in which
the mortgagors act of executing a new affidavit after the creditor extended
credit was deemed sufficient to constitute a new transaction and to save
the mortgage as against the creditor.
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eventually recorded before the creditor reduces his claim to a lien.41
This difference from the chattel mortgage situation may be explained
on the basis that the conditional sale, unlike the chattel mortgage,
has not generally been considered as fraudulent to creditors.42
Apparently it is not the debtor's possession alone that misleads his
creditors but his continued possesion of chattels which he originally
owned unencumbered.48 Why then, include creditors at all in the conditional sales statutes? If the answer is to obtain uniformity with the
chattel mortgage statutes that obviously has not been accomplished.
The Wyoming statute on conditional sales is almost unique. In
substance it provides that the seller's reservation of title by an unrecorded conditional sales contract is invalid against a judgment creditor of the buyer.44 On first consideration the provision for judgment
creditors seems odd. If the statute was intended as a rule of fraudulent conveyance there is no point in restricting its benefits to judgment creditors. On the other hand if it is intended only to establish a
rule of priority the term judgment creditor seems erronious because
ordinarily a judgment does not constitute a lien on the judgment
debtor's chattels.45 Perhaps the answer is to be found in another
Wyoming statutory provision which gives a judgment creditor a lien
on his debtors interest as a buyer under a conditional sales contract.46
Jones, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales, Bowers Edition, vol. 3 sec.
1111 and 1112. This situation is well illustrated by New York. There as prevously seen the unrecorded chattel mortgage is void as to general creditors
of the mortgagor. But the statute on conditional sales provides that the reservation of the title is void only as to those creditors of the buyer who get a
lien by attachment or levy before filing. See Baker v. Hull, 250 N. Y. 484,
166 N. E. 175 (1929).
42. Cole v. Berry, 42 N. J. L. 308 (1880). See 2 Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances
and Preferences, 1940, see. 512.
43. If this is the proper basis for the distinction between chattel mortgages and
conditional sales in this respect then it would seem that the same distinction
should be made between purchase money chattel mortgages and those where
the mortgagor owned the chattel prior to the mortgage.
44. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 41.801. The court in Crumrine v. Reynolds, 13
Wyo. 111, 78 Pac. 402 (1904) states that this statute was borrowed from
Nebraska and the present Nebraska statute is much the same. Rev. Stat. of
Nebraska, 1943, sec. 36-207. The statute of Alabama is similar in this respect,
Code of Alabama, 1940, title 47 sec. 131. Under thsee statutes it is clear
that the seller under the contract will prevail if he records before the
intervening creditor reduces his claim to judgment. Wilson v. Lewis, 63
Neb. 617, 88 N. W. 690 (1902). But neither state has any decision on the
situation where the contract is filed after judgment and before levy of
execution. The problem is recognized by dictum in General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Eaton, 24 Ala. App. 533, 137 So. 780 (1931).
45. Wyo. Comp. Stat., 1945, see. 3-4202. See Crumrine v. Reynolds, 13 Wyo. 111,
78 Pac. 402 (1904); Richardson v. Seybold, 76 Ind. 58 (1888).
46. Wyo. Comp. Stat., 1945, sec. 3-4719. This section is found in the article on
"Proceedings in Aid of Execution" which serves to emphasize that this
type of interest cannot be reached by ordinary execution. But the principal
is the same in that -the judgment creditor is ordinarily required to actually
institute such proceedings in order to obtain a lien on the property towards
which they are directed. See Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences,
1940, sec. 28.
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It would be interesting to learn the legislature's purpose in making a
judgment lien on this type of interest when something in the nature
of execution is necessary to give the judgment creditor a lien on any
other personal property of the judgment debtor. Certainly no reason
for this distinction comes readily to mind.
Mention should be made of another type of chattel security device,
the trust reciept. The Wyoming legislature recently adopted the Uniform Trust Receipt Act which, so far as relevant to our subject,
provides that the security interest created by such an instrument is
invalid as against lien creditors who become such without notice and
before filing.47 As an unambiguous statement of the proposition
contended for above, this provision is to be commended. But the
statute goes on to date the creditor's status as a lien creditor from
the time his writ of execution or attachment is issued. This, of course,
is at variance with the Wyoming statute on executions which gives
the creditor a lien only from the time of levy, and it is at variance,
too with the rule in many states that dates the lien from the time the
writ is delivered to the sheriff. In the interest of consistency it would
seem that this question of when the creditor acquires a lien status
could better be left to the general law of each state on execution.
The Uniform Conditional Sales Statute is subject to the same criticism
although it goes to the other extreme in dating the creditors lien from
the time of levy.48 In New York a decision of the highest court was
necessary to reconcile this provision with the general statute of that
state giving the.creditor a lien from the delivery of the writ to the
sheriff. The court held, and it was undoubtedly correct, that for purposes of the conditional sales statute the creditor should be deemed
to have a sufficient lien only upon levy of execution.49 But, even apart
from the inconsistency, this result is not entirely satisfactory since
it rests on the concept of a lien for which the law does not expressly
provide at any point.
But this last criticism concerns a detail only and should not
obscure the point that both these Uniform Acts treat the question
of the creditor's protection simply as one of priority in perfecting
conflicting claims to the same property, leaving no room for a construction in favor of general creditors on any theory. This idea seems
to be well imbedded now in the people who prepare uniform statutes.
The latest effort along these lines is the proposed Uniform Commercial Code.50 The principal characteristic of that part of the code deal47.

Wyo. Comp. Stat., 1945 sec. 39-1308 (Supp. 1947).

48. Uniform Laws Annotated, 1922, vol. 2 sec. 5.
49. Baker v. Hull, 250 N. Y. 484, 166 N. E. 175 (1929).
50.

This is presently being prepared under the joint auspices of the American

Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. A tentative draft of the complete code 'has been published by the
sponsoring bodies as the May 1949 Draft.
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ing with secured transactions is the elimination of most of the legal
distinctions presently existing among chattel mortgages, conditional
sales and other security devices and the substitution therefor of a
single concept of chattel security. As originally drafted this section
provided that a security interest could be defeated by any creditor
of the debtor who extended credit between the creation of the security
and its perfection, regardless of any subsequent perfection.51 It need
only be added that perfection in situations where the borrower remains
in possession would genarlly be accomplished by recording, to make
it obvious that this is substantially the same as the New York rule
with respect to chattel mortgages. To the writer this looked like a
step in reverse and he was pleased to observe that in the September
revision this provision had been dropped and the above discussed
provisions of the Uniform Trust Recipt Act substituted.52 A further
improvement has been made in the October revision by omitting the
provision defining the time at which the status of "lien creditor" shall
attach thus leaving that question to the general state law on executions
and attachments.5S

51.
52.
53.

Uniform Commercial Code, May 1949 Draft, sec. 7-107.
Uniform Commercial Code, September 1949 Revisions, sec. 8-802.
Uniform Commercial Code, October 1949 Revision, see. 8-801.

